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  I 
Abstract in English 
In a growing number of countries, the delivery of social welfare services is contracted out to 
private providers, and increasingly, using performance-based contracts.  Critics of performance-
based incentive contracts stress their potential unintended effects, including cream-skimming 
and other gaming activities intended to raise measured performance outcomes.  We analyze the 
incentive effects of performance-based contracts, as well as their impacts on provider job 
placement rates, using unique data on Dutch cohorts of unemployed and disabled workers that 
were assigned to private social welfare providers in 2002-2005.  We take advantage of variation 
in contract design over this period, where procured contracts gradually moved from partial 
performance-contingent pay to contracts with 100%-performance contingent reward schemes, 
and analyze the impact of these changes using panel data that allow us to control for cohort 
types and to develop explicit measures of selection into the programs.  We find evidence of 
cream-skimming and other gaming activities on the part of providers but little impact of these 
activities on job placement rates.  Overall, moving to a system with contract payments fully 
contingent on performance appears to increase job placements for more readily employable 
workers, although it does not affect the duration of their jobs. 
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  II 
Abstract in Dutch 
Steeds meer overheden besteden re-integratie uit aan re-integratiebedrijven, die vervolgens op 
hun prestaties worden afgerekend. Tegenstanders van het gebruik van deze prestatieprikkels 
wijzen op mogelijk ongewenste effecten, zoals het uitsluiten of verwaarlozen (‘parkeren’) van 
werklozen met geringe a priori baankansen ￿ ook wel ‘afroming’ genoemd. Dit onderzoek 
maakt gebruik van prestatiegegevens van door UWV aanbestede re-integratiebedrijven om deze 
ongewenste, maar ook gewenste effecten van prestatieprikkels (betere plaatsingsresultaten) vast 
te stellen. De gegevens beslaan een periode waarin het gebruik van volledig op plaatsing 
gebaseerde contracten (No Cure No Pay) geleidelijk toenam. Het blijkt dat deze overstap in het 
algemeen inderdaad leidde tot meer plaatsing in werk, maar dan wel vooral werk op basis van 
kort durende contracten. Het effect van NCNP-contracten op afroming was verder gering. 
Alleen bij kleinere aanbestede groepen arbeidsgehandicapten zijn er aanwijzingen dat re-
integratiebedrijven cliënten voorafgaand aan re-integratietrajecten meer uitsloten of parkeerden 
tijdens de re-integratietrajecten. 
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In a growing number of countries, the delivery of social welfare services is contracted out to 
private providers, and increasingly, using performance-based contracts.  Critics of performance-
based incentive contracts stress their potential unintended effects, including cream-skimming and 
other gaming activities intended to raise measured performance outcomes.  We analyze the 
incentive effects of performance-based contracts, as well as their impacts on provider job 
placement rates, using unique data on Dutch cohorts of unemployed and disabled workers that 
were assigned to private social welfare providers in 2002-2005.  We take advantage of variation 
in contract design over this period, where procured contracts gradually moved from partial 
performance-contingent pay to contracts with 100%-performance contingent reward schemes, 
and analyze the impact of these changes using panel data that allow us to control for cohort types 
and to develop explicit measures of selection into the programs.  We find evidence of cream-
skimming and other gaming activities on the part of providers but little impact of these activities 
on job placement rates.  Overall, moving to a system with contract payments fully contingent on 
performance appears to increase job placements for more readily employable workers, although 
it does not affect the duration of their jobs. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The majority of empirical studies on the use and effectiveness of performance incentives 
address performance-related pay in private firms, reflecting their greater prevalence in the 
private sector relative to the public sector (see Prendergast (1999) and Chiappori and Salanié 
(2003) for survey studies).  Compared to private sector production technologies, public sector 
work is more likely to involve complex, non-manual work, multiple principals and group 
dynamics, political and environmental influences and interdependencies, and non-standardized 
outputs that make precise measurement of performance challenging and costly (Blank 2000; 
Dixit 2002; Heinrich and Marschke, 2010).  In light of the larger role of random components in 
performance outcome measurement in the public sector, incentive structures are more likely to 
be low-powered (Burgess and Ratto 2003; Heinrich, 2007).  For this reason, our research is 
relatively unique in investigating a special case in which the delivery of publicly-funded social 
services moved to a system with very high-powered incentives, that is, with payments to 
contractors 100% contingent on their performance.  We are particularly interested in evaluating 
not only the effects of these incentives on client outcomes (job placements), but also the 
unintended effects of 100%-contingent performance-based contracting (‘No Cure No Pay’) on 
the delivery of social welfare services.  In other words, this public sector setting for the study in 
the Netherlands provides us with a unique case where both the financial incentives and the risks 
of social welfare provision were fully transferred to the social welfare providers.   
Although performance-based pay has a long history, its use in public sector contracts for 
delivery of social welfare services by private providers is a more recent phenomenon, and one 
that is becoming increasingly common.  Some of the first experiences with performance-based 
incentive schemes in the public sector date from U.S. employment and training programs,   3   
beginning with the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) of 1982 and continuing with the 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA), which replaced JTPA in 2000 (Barnow, 2000; Heckman et al. 
2002).  More recently, governments in Australia and the Netherlands switched to fully privatized 
systems with substantial performance incentives (Bruttel 2004; Struyven and Steurs 2005; Finn 
2008).  Contracting out public social welfare services to private providers is less widespread in 
the United Kingdom and Germany but is gradually becoming more important in these countries 
as well (Bernard and Wolff 2008; Tergeist and Grubb 2006; Winterhager et al. 2006).   
  As the literature on contracting social welfare services has grown, concerns about the 
unintended effects of performance-based contracting have risen as well.  There is some 
consensus that these contracts have increased measured performance outcomes, but they are 
frequently accompanied by various distortionary effects, such as cream-skimming and other 
gaming activities.  In some settings, this has led to a retraction in the use of performance-based 
contract incentives, with some governments reverting to fixed-payment schemes for private 
providers or even contracting back in (Hefetz and Warner 2004).  Examples here include the 
reappraisal of in-house provision of welfare-to-work services to Social Assistance recipients in 
the Netherlands and changes in the contract design and management of the Wisconsin Works 
program (Koning 2009; Heinrich and Choi 2007).  Clearly, these reappraisals and retractions 
reflect in part the challenges of getting incentives right and managing performance-based 
contracting arrangements.  Still, there is little empirical evidence on the overall effectiveness of 
performance-based contracting schemes in social welfare programs that factors in both their 
intended and unintended effects and assesses their relative importance for program outcomes.  
For example, providers that cream-skim workers with high a priori job placement rates may well   4   
be present, but if these groups of workers are also more likely to benefit from programs 
(Heckman et al., 2002), the efficiency costs of cream-skimming may be low.   
  We aim to help fill this gap in the literature by undertaking an integrative analysis of the 
distortive effects of performance-based contracting with private social welfare service providers, 
as well as their impact on the overall effectiveness of performance schemes.  For this purpose, 
we use unique data on Dutch cohorts of unemployed and disabled workers that were assigned to 
private welfare-to-work (WTW) providers in performance-based contracts in 2002-2005.  Over 
this period, procured contracts gradually moved from No Cure Less Pay (NCLP) to No Cure No 
Pay (NCNP) reward schemes, the latter of which constituted a fully (100%) performance-
contingent contract, with payments made only for clients placed in jobs.  We analyze the impact 
of this change on job placement rates as an overall measure of program effectiveness and 
investigate the importance of possible distortive effects of the incentives, using data from 
multiple contract periods with controls for cohort (worker) types.  To account for selection in the 
process of allocating cohorts of workers and NCNP contracts, we estimate two-stage treatment 
selection models and fixed-effect models that control for cohort characteristics affecting both the 
payment scheme and program outcomes. 
This study makes several important contributions to the literature.  First, we observe the 
numbers of workers that were assigned to WTW providers but did actually not start programs, 
allowing us to develop explicit measures of pre-program selection that may constitute a form of 
cream-skimming.  We test whether the additional incentives associated with NCNP (fully 
performance-contingent) contracting have changed the shares of clients that do not start 
programs, distinguishing between clients that do not show up at the program (i.e. client-induced 
selection) and clients that are being returned to the social benefit administration by providers (i.e.   5   
provider-induced selection).  We also explore (empirically) whether client- and/or provider-
induced selection is related to the job placement rates of contractors.   
  Second, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is one of the first to explicitly address in 
an empirical analysis the issue of the “parking” of hard-to-place WTW clients.  Within the 
context of our analysis, parking is defined as not serving hard-to-place clients who have been 
assigned to WTW programs.  In other words, parking might be characterized as a form of cream-
skimming during the program, in which providers try to maximize placement rates and keep 
costs down by focusing resources on the most able clients while doing little to serve those with 
the poorest job prospects.  As this activity increases the job placement rates of clients with better 
a priori job prospects, we expect this to reduce the observed average job search duration of the 
subsample of job finders, while also widening the gap in job placement probabilities between 
clients with better and worse job prospects.  We therefore develop a test statistic for parking that 
exploits observed average job search durations of job finders in NCLP and NCNP cohorts.   
  Finally, our analysis addresses the importance of other gaming activities that increase the 
emphasis on short-term job placements for performance outcomes.  We investigate whether the 
move to NCNP contracting affects the duration of job placements among job finders, where jobs 
lasting for at least one year are considered to be more durable.  In particular, we analyze the 
effectiveness of NCNP incentives in raising total job placement rates, with the expectation that 
they will be more successful in increasing short-term job placements, or even lead to substitution 
of short-term for long-term placements.   
The results of our analysis are consistent with theoretical predictions that incentives are 
most likely to work when the financial risks of performance-contingent payments for providers 
are not too large to induce selection and parking behavior.  Our analysis also shows that the   6   
overall pre-program selection and parking activities were probably minimal.  NCNP contracting 
appeared to increase job placements for some cohorts, but it did not affect job duration and was 
not effective in raising job placement rates for those in disability insurance cohorts.  Taking a 
broader perspective, our results are consistent with the classic economic trade-off between risk 
and incentives.  That is, for larger cohorts where the risk of failing to place clients in jobs is 
spread over a broader client base (i.e., the per-client risk is smaller), we find less of an effect of 
NCNP incentives on selection and parking behavior.  Conversely, for smaller contracted cohorts 
with greater risks of non-payment due to performance, the evidence points to more selection and 
parking.   
  This paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on cream-
skimming, parking and other gaming activities, with special interest in the role of institutions in 
determining or incentivizing these phenomena.  Section 3 describes the cohort and contract data 
and methods we use, while explaining the institutional context in which they originate.  Section 4 
presents the empirical analysis and findings, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
Research to date suggests that the nature and incidence of cream-skimming, parking and 
other gaming activities are strongly influenced by institutional settings.  As Heinrich and 
Marschke (2010) explain, incentives should be used (and should be more powerful) in 
organizations where individuals are able to respond to them.  In some public sector settings, 
however, workers are highly constrained by procedural rules and regulations that allow little 
discretion for manipulating or improving program processes or by environmental conditions that 
interfere with outcomes (e.g., a high unemployment rate or an economically disadvantaged   7   
population), and thus, imposing performance-based contractual provisions subjects them to 
greater risk of lower compensation.  In other organizational environments, program 
implementers may have more leeway to try out innovative ways of increasing program value and 
may therefore be more responsive to performance incentives in intended ways.  In the typical, 
relatively constrained social service setting, however, unintended practices such as cream-
skimming, or the selection of easier-to-place clients by providers, are expected to increase if 
payments or rewards are performance-based, as workers with bad a priori job prospects will 
increase the risk of no (or lower) payments (Heckman et al. 2002).  Of course, this response is 
conditional on the extent to which providers are able to select clients, and to select them in ways 
that influence performance outcomes.  
In U.S. employment and training programs, for example, program participation is 
voluntary, with decisions on the part of both potential participants and gatekeepers (program 
administrators) determining access to services.  In their study of cream-skimming in JTPA 
programs, Heckman and Smith (2004) analyzed multiple stages of the JTPA selection process, 
including eligibility, awareness, application, acceptance and formal enrollment.  They concluded 
that applicants’ progression through these stages toward enrollment was less influenced by 
cream-skimming on the part of program workers than by factors beyond the control of service 
providers (Heckman and Smith 2004).  Moreover, there is no strong evidence in the literature 
that social service providers routinely exploit the discretion they have to cream-skim, and in 
some contexts, the incentives to do so may be mitigated by formal adjustments to performance 
standards that reduce the risks of serving specific “hard-to-place” groups (Heinrich et al. 1996; 
Barnow and Heinrich, forthcoming; Courty et al. 2009).  Courty, Marschke and Kim (2009) 
show empirically how formal performance standard adjustments compel providers to factor in   8   
not only how client characteristics affect performance outcomes, but also how they influence 
performance standards.  Thus, incentives to cream-skim on observed characteristics that are 
accounted for in the adjustments are likely to be reduced, although cream-skimming may still 
occur on unobservable characteristics within the hard-to-place groups.  
  In other settings, admission into programs may be compulsory, allowing little room for 
selection by providers.  Examples of such programs include those in Australia, the UK and the 
Netherlands, where participation in welfare-to-work (WTW) programs has been compulsory for 
unemployed workers (Finn 2008).  In these programs, all assigned clients do not necessarily 
enroll, as some prefer to risk being sanctioned or may find jobs prior to the program on their own.  
In Australia and the UK, the assignment of worker cohorts is fully compulsory for WTW 
providers as well, implying that providers have no discretion to return workers to the social 
benefit administration (i.e., to decline to serve them).  In contrast, providers in the Netherlands 
are allowed to return clients assigned to them, but with the caveat that returning too many 
workers may decrease their chances of being contracted to provide services in the future (Koning 
2007). 
  The picture that emerges from these studies is that cream-skimming is probably less 
important and prevalent than suspected or stressed by policymakers, particularly in programs 
where selection occurs at earlier stages of awareness and application (with little leeway for 
selection by providers).  Still, concerns have arisen about the possibility of other gaming 
activities that occur in the implementation of programs, such as parking in WTW-programs 
(Bruttel 2004; Finn 2008).  For example, one view is that the parking of assigned clients (after 
the start of a program)—which typically results in a bare minimum of services for harder-to-
place clients—may represent a substitute for cream-skimming, particularly in contexts where   9   
pre-program selection is effectively prohibited or restricted.  Moreover, WTW providers can 
spend time in assessing the a priori job prospects of workers and use this information to 
determine how they will allocate “parking spaces,” rather than using it for selecting clients prior 
to the program.  The experiences of some providers, clients and caseworkers, as well as 
anecdotal evidence, suggests an association between incentive-based contracts and parking 
activities.  Still, empirical evidence on the importance of parking is almost nonexistent, likely 
due to difficulties in observing provider efforts and budget allocations.   
  Among the early empirical analyses of gaming of measured program outcomes in social 
services provision were those conducted by Courty and Marschke (1997, 2004), who analyzed 
how JTPA providers manipulated the timing of client exits from employment and training 
programs to maximize their rewards.  Courty and Marschke showed that providers were more 
likely to postpone the exit of poorly performing clients in relatively unsuccessful program years 
and to increase the number of exits of these clients in good years when they were confident of 
achieving the minimum performance standards required to secure an award.  In effect, these 
types of gaming activities increase measured performance but lower the efficiency of the system.  
In more recent work, Courty and Marschke (2008) present a broader framework for detecting 
increases in distortions in performance measures associated with contract incentives, showing 
that the alignment between a performance measure and the true goal of the organization may 
decrease after a performance measure is introduced, as bureaucrats respond by exploring all 
strategies for raising it, not just those that also increase program value.   
Heckman et al. (2002) also show that short-term outcomes of programs may bear very 
little relationship to long-term outcomes.  Thus, performance standards relying on readily 
available data on outcomes, such as job placement rates and wages at placement, may not   10   
necessarily advance the longer-term goals of public programs (such as employment retention or 
longer-run earnings gains).  In many of these cases, the incompleteness of performance measures 
is inherent in social services provision, where longer-term outcomes are more difficult to 
measure, rather than an artifact of institutional settings (see also Dias and Maynard-Moody 2006). 
Similar to cream-skimming, it seems clear that the incidence and type of gaming 
activities are strongly determined by institutional settings.  In the JTPA program, where the vast 
majority of studies have been undertaken to date, a combination of discretion over the timing of 
reporting on program outcomes and the use of performance thresholds triggered providers to 
game the system in these ways.  With linear contracts, however, like the NCLP and NCNP 
systems, gaming along these lines is less likely to benefit providers, particularly if client records 
are linked directly to the administration of benefits in a way that leaves no discretion in the 
timing of reporting “successful” program exits.  Still, even with linear incentives and without 
discretion in reporting successful programs, providers may use their discretion in determining the 
end date of the program, that is, the reporting of “unsuccessful programs”.  In particular, 
extending programs may result in additional windfall gains of job placements on the one hand (a 
gaming behavior), while creating additional program costs on the other.  The impact of 
optimizing the duration of program lengths (for unsuccessful clients) on job placement rates is 
not clear.  And taking an even broader perspective, it remains unclear what the overall impact of 
the unintended effects of performance-based contracting in social welfare services may be 
relative to its intended effects.
1  
                                                            
1 Thus far, the only notable exception appears to be the study by Burgess et al. (2004), who investigated the 
effectiveness of performance-related pay for public employment offices.  They find the effectiveness of incentive 
effects to be confined to small offices, but do not address the issues of parking and gaming.   11   
3.  DATA AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT  
In the Netherlands (the setting of this study), the Disability Insurance (DI) and Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) programs are mandatory for all workers.  Both DI and UI are implemented by the 
social benefit administration.  Similar to the New Deal in the United Kingdom, providers are 
expected to offer unemployed and partially disabled clients mediation, job training or subsidized 
employment within twelve months after the start of their benefit spell.
2  In the period under 
investigation (2002-2005), the Dutch social benefit administration
3 contracted out the delivery of 
these WTW-services to private job training service providers only.  As of 2006, the delivery of 
social welfare services by the social benefit administration was replaced by a dual system, where 
clients could either opt for individual vouchers and were free to choose (preferred) providers or 
choose to be assigned to cohorts—like in the system that was compulsory until 2005.  In 2007 
the privatization of social welfare services was reversed to some extent—that is, the social 
benefit administration resumed the delivery of social welfare services for their clients with 
relatively good job prospects.  Thus, both of these changes to the system caused the number of 
procured cohorts (and subsequently the number of clients) with NCNP contracts to decrease 
substantially from 2006.   
                                                            
2 As of 2005, however, the New Deal approach has been relaxed in the Netherlands.  This is mirrored by a decrease 
in the number of WTW-clients in 2005. 
3 In Dutch: Uivoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen (UWV).   12   
 
Table 1: Sample statistics of contracted cohort data: observations and population averages  
(Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
  Years  Contract types 
  2002  2003  2004  2005  NCLP  NCNP 
# Gross cohort types  16  13  10  11  17  7 
# Cohort types  52  20  17  17  93  13 
# Cohorts  3,733  1,292  1,690  1,795  7,441  1,069 
# Assigned clients  105,623  66,861  47,910  23,436  193,361  50,469 
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Table 2: Gross cohort types, cohort types, cohorts and client numbers. 
   
Gross cohort type    # Years   Cohort 




Disabled immigrants, bad job prospects    3  9  1,157  10,583  0.000 
(.) 
Disabled, good job prospects    3  8  954  40,737  0.243 
(0.439) 
Disabled: mental impairments    2  6  805  31,517  0.000 
(.) 
Disabled: mild mental impairments    4  9  1,097  30,709  0.000 
(.) 
Disabled: work related impairments    1  5  49  722  0.000 
(.) 
Disabled: kidney patients    4  4  35  510  0.000 
(.) 
Disabled: visual and hearing impairments    3  4  152  1,988  0.000 
(.) 
Disabled: young workers, no work history    3  14  757  7,325  0.023 
(0.151) 
             
Unemployed immigrants    2  2  190  6,616  0.000 
(.) 
Unemployed, good job prospects    4  9  826  51,177  0.629 
(0.483) 
Unemployed, older than 50 years    3  9  537  20,358  0.000 
(.) 
Unemployed, bad job prospects    3  9  705  18,409  0.000 
(.) 
Unemployed: highly educated    2  2  52  962  1.000 
(.) 
             
Workers in graphical industry    1  5  49  722  0.000 
(.) 
Workers eligible for subsidized employment    1  1  89  767  0.000 
(.) 
Returned clients (“second chance” programs)    2  5  427  7,649  0.097 
(0.296) 
Trajectories aiming at self-employment    2  2  92  1,081  0.000 
(.) 
Other    3  7  586  12,720  0.508 
(0.500) 
   14   
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the characteristics of cohorts that were contracted out to 
WTW-providers in 2002-2005 and were registered by the social benefit administration, stratified 
with respect to calendar years and contract payment schemes (NCNP and NCLP).  Table 2 
presents information on the structure, size and characterization of the difference cohort types and 
cohorts.  As is apparent in this table, each year the Dutch social benefit administration defined 
cohort types that were assigned to private providers in separate groups and with separate contract 
conditions, so as to allow for specialized services and decrease opportunities to cream-skim 
within cohorts.   
In the data, cohorts can be specified to three digit levels.  The first digit level indicates a 
broad characterization of cohort types that holds for all years in our data and includes 18 
categories.  These “gross” cohort types are observed in almost all years of our sample (see the 
second column of Table 2).  Gross cohort types are characterized by specific client groups in the 
UI and DI scheme, but some smaller groups are defined by other strata.  These client groups 
include immigrants, those with good or bad job prospects (after being profiled by social benefit 
administration caseworkers), disabled workers with special impairments, and older workers or 
young disabled workers without any work history.   
The second digit level entails a more detailed description of the contract types and 
activities that have been contracted out in subsequent years.  In particular, the designation of 
program types for the gross cohort types has varied over time, depending on the specific needs 
pertinent at that time.  Examples include programs aimed at guiding workers into self-
employment, job training, job hunting and job mediation.  The resulting cohort types that started 
a program were defined distinctly for each year.  Moreover, contract conditions—particularly   15   
those regarding the payment schemes, NCLP and NCNP—also varied according to these 
contract types.  Thus, it is important to stress that contract conditions did not result from 
negotiations between the social benefit administration and providers.  Rather, these were set 
prior to the bidding process, with an increasing share of NCNP contract types over time.
4  In 
total, there were 106 cohort types that were contracted out in 2002-2005, with most the 
observations in 2002—the year in which the most clients were contracted out as well.  As WTW-
providers complained about the administrative burden that came with the bidding process 
involving so many cohort types, the number of cohort and contract types was reduced 
substantially in 2003. 
Finally, the third digit level indicates the actual cohort that was assigned to a particular 
provider, in a specific region and at a specific time point.
5  In effect, the contract conditions for 
these cohorts were defined by contract types, with within-type-variation in the actual cohort 
outcomes potentially stemming from cohort size, region and the provider.  As Table 2 shows, 
many cohorts (particularly the larger ones) consisted of (UI) workers with better job prospects.  
In addition, we observe a substantial increase in the average cohort size in 2003 (from 28 to 
52)—resulting from the aforementioned reduction in cohort types.  In 2004, however, the 
average cohort size returned to its 2002 level.  We also see a general decline in the number of 
WTW-clients in the period under investigation.  In particular, the numbers of newly assigned 
program participants dropped from about 105,000 clients in 2002 to about 67,000 in 2003 and 
from about 48,000 in 2004 to 23,000 in 2005.  We suggest two possible explanations for this 
pattern: business cycle effects and a relaxation of the New Deal strategy from 2005 onward, 
where the social benefit administration no longer aimed to fully treat clients within twelve 
                                                            
4 Koning (2007) discusses the bidding process for cohorts in more detail.   16   
months after the start of their UI or DI spell (Groot et al. 2006; Finn 2008).  It also should be 
noted that the new procurement system in 2002 also applied to cohorts that entered in earlier 
years, when the New Deal strategy had not taken off yet, implying a backlog of clients may have 
been waiting for services in 2002. 
NCLP and NCNP contracts 
During the contracting process, individual clients within a particular cohort were not known yet 
by the WTW provider.  Providers were only informed about the average characteristics of the 
cohort types, the expected cohort size, and contract conditions.  As Table 1 shows, the share of 
NCNP contracting for contract types gradually increased, from close to zero in 2002 to more 
than half of the contracts in 2005 (weighted by the gross cohort size).  Table 2 shows that NCNP 
contracts were confined to four gross cohort types, mostly consisting of (UI) workers with better 
job prospects.  This largely explains why the average (expected) payment of NCNP contracts 
was lower than NCLP contracts in the period—we return to this issue in the next section.  On 
average, about 50 percent of the NCLP contracts were paid as a fixed amount, with the other 50 
percent paid at placement.    
Provider and client-induced selection 
In awarding contracts to particular providers, client addresses were transferred to the provider, 
who in turn had to contact the clients and make a reintegration plan together with them.  This 
reintegration plan included a list of proposed activities to get the client back to work, as well as 
the rights and duties of the provider and the client.  In order for the program to get started, the 
reintegration plan had to be approved by the social benefit administration.  In practice, 
reintegration plans were not formulated for all individual clients and/or were not approved in all 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 Koning (2007) studies the performance of for-profit and non-profit WTW-providers, taking cohorts per provider 
per region as a relevant unit of investigation and aggregating cohorts that started at different dates within a year.   17   
cases. Thus, we distinguish “gross” cohorts that were assigned to a provider from “net” cohorts 
of clients for which reintegration plans were submitted and approved by the social benefit 
administration.  The resulting difference between gross and net participation, shown in Table 1, 
therefore reflects both provider- and client-induced selection.  As to the former, providers were 
allowed to send back some clients if they viewed them as “unsuitable” for the program.  We 
suggest that this form of selection is most likely to be associated with cream-skimming.  Over 
the years, the population-weighted fraction of provider-induced selection ranged from 1 to 3% of 
the gross cohorts.  Although there was no formal limit on the percentage of provider-induced 
selection, providers were aware that high rates of this type of selection would diminish their 
prospects of future contracts.   
We define client-induced selection as the balance of assigned clients who did not 
participate in the programs but were not returned by the service provider either. This group most 
likely consisted of clients that already had found a job by the time the trajectory started or for 
whom the reintegration plans were not approved by the social benefit administration.  In both 
cases, clients were no longer assigned to their respective job training service provider, and thus, 
did not affect providers’ future prospects for contracts.  Client-induced selection increased from 
11% in 2002 to 16% in 2005.  In addition, it was about 4 percentage points higher for NCNP 
contracts than NCLP contracts, suggesting that clients assigned to NCNP contracts may have 
been more likely to find jobs in the time span between assignment and the actual start of the 
program.    18   
Parking, gaming and job placement 
Over the years, we have observed a gradual increase in the job placement rates of new cohorts 
that join the WTW programs.  This holds for both job placements with employer-employee 
contracts of 6 to 12 months and contracts for more than 12 months.  The definitive placement 
rates per cohort were measured at the end of the program for all (net) assigned clients.  Table 1 
also shows that the share of NCNP contracts—with higher placement rates—has increased over 
time.  We find more marked differences between payment forms and the average duration of 
both “successful” job finders and “unsuccessful” clients (who haven’t found employment within 
the time span of the program).   
We also explore whether the shorter job search durations of clients among NCNP 
contracts corresponds to the presence of parking activities in these programs—that is, whether 
providers concentrate on shortening job search durations among clients with high a priori job 
chances, while letting hard-to-place clients languish in the programs.  Heretofore, figures 1 and 2 
depict the distributions of (average) job search durations for successful and unsuccessful NCLP 
and NCNP cohorts, respectively.  These figures suggest that the average job search durations of 
both job finders and non-job finders were shorter and less dispersed for the NCNP contracts.  
More specifically, it appears that most WTW programs for unsuccessful participants end after 
two years for NCNP cohorts, whereas for NCLP cohorts, they may participate for as long as 
three years.  Still, a more formal analysis is needed to distinguish the role of payment schemes in 
these patterns of effects, as job search durations are undoubtedly driven by participant 
characteristics as well.    19   
 
Figure 1:  Distribution of average successful durations: 



























Figure 2:  Distribution of average unsuccessful durations:  
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4.   EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
General research approach 
Above we defined and described different stages in the contracting and provision of WTW 
services in the Netherlands.  In this section, we analyze how the shift to NCNP contracting has 
influenced the responses (intended and unintended) of providers in implementing these programs, 
and how this in turn has affected overall program effectiveness.  
We first analyze the decision process of the social benefit administration in choosing 
between NCLP and NCNP payment schemes.  Second, we address pre-program selection 
responses—both provider and client-induced—to the new performance-based incentives.  
Supposing that pre-program cream-skimming would increase under NCNP incentives, we expect 
provider-induced selection—and to a lesser extent client-induced selection—to increase.  Third, 
we study the effect of NCNP contracting on parking behavior for clients that actually start their 
programs and develop a test that uses information on the average successful job search duration 
per cohort in our sample.  Finally, we estimate the (overall) effect of payment schemes on 
performance outcomes—both for shorter employer-employee contracts and longer ones—
focusing special attention on the role of pre-program selection.  In particular, if NCNP 
contracting has increased such selection, this may have affected the placement rates in an 
indirect way as well. 
As Chiappori and Salanié (2003) point out in their survey study, a unifying theme in 
empirical studies on the effects of contracting is the necessity to control adequately for 
unobserved heterogeneity and selection bias.  Clearly, this holds for each stage in the estimation 
procedure.   For example, the allocation of contract types may be also driven by the (a priori) 
expected job prospects of the cohort types.  We therefore use two research strategies to control   21   
for possible selection effects.  The first strategy takes explicit account of the allocation process of 
NCNP contracts, by estimating two-stage treatment selection models.  In this approach, we use 
data from 2002 (a baseline year) as exclusion restrictions, assuming, for instance, that placement 
risks of contracts affect the choice of payment schemes but not job placement outcomes 
themselves in a direct way.  Thus, we do not rely only on the distributional (normality) 
assumption of the selection model itself, but rather on exclusion restrictions to estimate the 
effects of performance-based incentives.  The second research approach entails the use of gross 
cohort type fixed effects (FE) to control for cohort characteristics affecting both the payment 
scheme and program outcomes.  Using (net) cohort types as fixed effects here would yield more 
precise controls, but then the effects of payment schemes—which vary between contract types 
only—would no longer be identified.    
In both of these research strategies, one should be aware that the size of observed cohorts 
in our data varies substantially over time, affecting the variance of (pre-) program outcomes as 
well.  Individual clients have a higher probability of being part of large cohorts than smaller ones, 
so equal weights for all observations may yield inefficient coefficient estimates.  We therefore 
estimate model specifications with cohort size as relative (analytic) weights as well (see also 
Koning 2007).  Within the context of (conventional) fixed effects (FE) estimation, however, 
rescaling is cumbersome, since observed weights are not constant within cohort contracts.  We 
therefore follow Mundlak (1978), who proposes a specification for fixed effects with pooled 
data—that is, we re-specify the cohort-specific effect as a function of averages per gross cohort 
types.  Using this approach on pooled data yields estimates that are equivalent to those with FE 
estimation, at least for those variables with variation within gross cohort types.  In other words,   22   
in contrast to the conventional fixed effects specification, the pooled model allows for the use of 
cohort size as relative (‘analytic’) weights.    
Assignment of NCNP contracts and provider responses 
The use of performance-based pay is typically modeled as a classic trade-off between risk and 
incentives, a perspective that may also well apply to the choice of WTW contracts and the 
associated risk stemming from the uncertainty of cohort job placement rates (Burgess and Ratto 
2003).  Adopting a standard concave utility function for WTW providers, where providers are 
more risk averse than the social benefit administration, it can easily be shown that the impact of 
this risk will be higher for lower (expected) job placement rates.  As risk is transferred to the 
provider in the form of performance-contingent pay, a higher risk premium will be required for 
cohorts with lower job placement probabilities, and the use of NCNP contracts will be less 
attractive.  We also expect risk premiums per client to be lower if cohorts are larger, implying a 
lower variance of average placement rates.  Analogously, it could be argued that providers with 
high market shares will require lower risk premiums.  Within the context of the Dutch WTW-
system, however, it should be noted that payment schemes were fixed in advance, so there was 
no negotiating on risk premiums.  Thus, if large providers are overrepresented in NCNP cohorts, 
this could be due to the fact that these providers were more likely to bid for and/or be awarded 
these cohorts, with contract conditions being exogenous. 
In testing these hypotheses, we first estimate a probit model that explains the use of the 
NCNP payment scheme (NCNP) among cohorts for 2003 to 2005, as a function of cohort and 
(assigned) provider characteristics.  In particular, we specify the use of NCNP as: 
 
(1)  Pr ( NCNPijk, t = 1 ) = Φ (  X i., t=2002 bNCNP + Y ij, t dNCNP )   23   
 
with i as an index for the gross cohort type ( i = 1,..,I ) , j as an index for the cohort type ( j = 
1,..,J ), k indicating the actual cohort ( k = 1,..K ) and t denoting years ( t = 2002,..,2005).  Φ is 
the cumulative standard normal distribution function.  Further, X represents average values of the 
job placement rates and average risk proxies per gross cohort type in 2002, which we are using 
as a baseline year (that is, where NCNP contracts were still almost absent and the social benefit 
administration decided on the assignment of NCNP contracts for the next year).  We argue that 
these baseline observations are exogenous with respect to later program outcomes, such as the 
job placement rates.  Alternatively, Y includes explanatory variables that vary over time and per 
cohort type j.  These are the market share of the assigned provider of the actual cohort 
observation, the (expected) reward per client, and an indicator variable for cohorts with disability 
insurance recipients only.  Finally, it should be noted that payment conditions only vary between 
(106) contract types.  Thus, standard errors for the estimates have to be adjusted for contract-type 
clustering effects.     24   
 
Table 3:  Probit estimation results for NCNP cohorts (2003-2005) 
(Marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses; *, ** and ***  
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively) 
 




Average job placement rate (per gross cohort type in 2002)  1.372***  (0.659) 
Risk proxy (per gross cohort type in 2002)  ─0.119**  (0.083) 
Provider market share  ─0.095  (0.111) 
(Expected) Reward per client  ─0.090***  (0.039) 
Disability Insurance (dummy)  0.026  (0.060) 
Year = 2004  ─0.054  (0.071) 
Year = 2005  0.066  (0.100) 
     
Number of observations  3,959   
Pseudo-R-squared  0.484   
Log likelihood  ─1,010.2   
 




Generally, almost all of the coefficient estimates in Table 3 corroborate the standard risk-
incentives framework.  First, we find the probability of NCNP contracts in 2003-2005 to increase 
with respect to the average job placement rate per gross cohort type in 2002.  In particular, a 10 
percentage point increase in the job placement rate increases the probability of a NCNP payment 
scheme about 14 percentage points.  The proxy for risk involved with the contracted cohort, that 
is, the standard deviation of the average job placement rate of the observed cohort per client (in 
2002), is negatively associated with the probability of NCNP payment schemes.  This is again in 
line with standard risk premium arguments.  Interestingly, higher payments offered (per   25   
placement) for a given cohort is negatively related to the likelihood of a NCNP payment scheme, 
likely reflecting that higher payments per placement signal the difficulties of placing these 
cohorts into jobs and the risk for placement rate outcomes associated with serving them.  In 
contrast, we do not find a relationship between the provider market share and the likelihood of 
NCNP schemes.  This result is not surprising, in light of our earlier point that payment schemes 
were determined ex ante by cohort characteristics and not by the providers assigned to these 
cohorts.  It may still be that selection of larger providers into NCNP contracts has occurred in the 
bidding process, after the release of contract type descriptions and corresponding payment 
schemes.  That said, our results do not suggest that selection in the bidding process was 
important; that is, the probit model estimates do not indicate that the concentration of (large) 
WTW providers for these contract types has increased over time.   
An alternative test for concentration effects of providers would involve a direct 
comparison between measures of market concentration of NCLP vis-à-vis NCNP contract types.  
Therefore, we calculated Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (HHI), using the market shares of all 
providers per cohort type j and per year t.
6  Over the years, the resulting (average) HHI scores are 
fairly constant, ranging between 0.25 and 0.30.  We also do not find a significant difference 
between the HHI averages of NCLP and NCNP cohort types.  Again, this suggests that large-
scale providers did not expand their market shares in NCNP cohorts, crowding out smaller ones.  
Finally, we also compared the persistency of market shares of providers in gross cohort types 
that switched from NCLP to NCNP contracting in 2003-2005 to those that continued as NCLP 
contracts.  We found 57.6 percent of the providers in the first category to be awarded with 
contracts in 2003-2005 for the same gross cohort types, and 50 percent in the second category to   26   
be awarded with contracts for the same gross cohort types.  This suggests that persistency rates 
were higher in the NCNP gross cohort types.   
Pre-program selection effects 
As discussed above, we measure two types of selection effects with our data: provider-induced 
selection and client-induced selection.  In addition to direct selection by sending clients back, 
providers may have also used more subtle ways to selectively treat clients, such as exerting less 
effort in working with certain clients or even by discouraging them to fill in reintegration plans 
and/or start the program.  As WTW providers were not formally held responsible for such 
indirect client-induced selection, this would not necessarily diminish their future prospects of 
being assigned new cohorts.  Providers may therefore have tried to influence client-induced 




ijk, t   =  a
P NCNP ij,t   +   Zijk, t b








ijk, t   =  a
C NCNP ij,t   +   Zijk, t b
C   +   ε
C




C denote the observed provider and client-induced selection shares of the assigned 
clients to a provider.  Both these selection measures are observed per cohort k belonging to 
cohort type j and gross cohort type i.  The variables a
P and a
C describe the effect of NCNP 
contracting on provider and client-induced selection, respectively.  Again, it should be noted here 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
6 We also calculated HHI values per gross cohort type.  Obviously, as gross cohort types are more heterogeneous 
than cohort types, this resulted in lower HHI-values, but again there were no significant differences between NCLP   27   
that the payment scheme dummy NCNP varies with (gross) cohort type only. b
P and b
C are 
vectors denoting the effects of the matrix Z on provider- and client-induced selection, 
respectively.  Note that the matrix Z includes variables that all vary over i, j, k and t.  Finally, ε
P 
and ε
C are i.i.d. residual terms with mean zero and variance σP
2 and σC
2. 
  Equations (2) and (3) can be estimated with standard GLS techniques, using cohort size 
as analytic weights.  In addition, we have indicated earlier that we essentially follow two 
estimation strategies to control for selection effects.  The first strategy is to estimate treatment 
selection models for NCNP, with equation (1) in the first stage and S
P and S
C (equations (2) and 
(3)) in the second stage.  Thus, equations (2) and (3) are extended with coefficient estimates of 
the Mill’s ratios that are obtained from equation (1).  As equation (1) includes the exogenous 
baseline parameters for 2002 and is estimated for observations from 2003 to 2005, the time span 
for observations that are used to estimate equations (2) and (3) is limited to this period as well.   
The second estimation strategy is a fixed effects estimation of equations (2) and (3), with 
gross cohort types as the relevant units.  Thus, our basic assumption in this model is that ε
P and 
ε
C consist of a time invariant, fixed gross cohort effect that may be correlated with NCNP and a 
residual term that is assumed to be uncorrelated. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and NCNP gross cohort types.   28   
 
Table 4: Estimation results of provider and client-induced model 
(Effects in %-points; standard errors in parentheses; *,** and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%) 
 
  Provider-induced selection  Client-induced selection 












             












             




































Year = 2003  ─0.745*** 
(0.225) 




  0.988 
(0.830) 




































             
Mill’s lambda    ─0.207** 
(0.094) 
    ─2.122 
(1.712) 
 
Rho    ─0.077** 
(0.036) 
    ─0.229 
(0.183) 
 
             
R-squared  0.091    0.103  0.083    0.139 
Log likelihood    7,617.3      2,750.1   
             
Note that the regressions also included (6) region dummies as controls in all specifications.  
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Table 4 shows the estimation results for equations (2) and (3), using GLS and the 
treatment selection model and fixed effects approaches.  The coefficient estimates of NCNP have 
the expected (positive) signs in all cases, although only about half are statistically significant at 
α<0.05.  As for provider-induced selection, both the magnitude and the range of estimates are 
small (0.6 to 0.8 percentage -point), suggesting the potential for (any) cream skimming from this 
source is robust but also likely limited.  As the (average) share of client-induced selection is 
much more substantial than that of provider-induced selection, the room for any differences 
between NCLP and NCNP cohorts seems higher as well.  Still, the fixed effect estimates suggest 
that WTW-providers do not seem to affect these outcomes to a large extent.  The results also 
show that provider-induced selection is higher in DI cohorts, which is probably due to the higher 
degree of specialization of services that is needed for these cohorts.  Finally, we only find the 
year dummy coefficients to be significant for provider-induced selection, with a downward trend 
over time.  It may be that providers became more aware of the consequences of high provider-
induced selection rates over the years, therefore trying to keep these numbers low.   30   
 
Table 5: Fixed effect estimation results of NCNP on provider and client-induced selection 
 (Effects in %-points; standard errors in parentheses;  
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%) 
 












< 50 clients      1.177***  (0.413)  4.588*  (2.445) 
≥ 50 clients      0.519  (0.417)  1.115  (1.151) 
             
DI cohorts      1.515***  (0.313)  5.285***  (1.981) 
UI cohorts      0.047  (0.266)  ─0.353  (1.121) 
 
 
  Table 5 presents the (pooled) fixed effect estimates of NCNP schemes on provider and 
client-induced selection for subsamples with different cohort sizes (more or less than 50 clients) 
and benefit schemes (UI or DI).
7  These estimates suggest that for both selection measures, the 
effect of NCNP schemes has been strongest in the (smaller) DI cohorts.  It may well be that the 
risks associated with having DI clients with poor job prospects in smaller cohorts were 
exacerbated by the NCNP scheme.  Training and mediation costs are substantial for this group, 
whereas the risk of not receiving any (flexible) payments (due to failure to place) was substantial, 
too.  Still, one should bear in mind that the estimated effect of about 5 percentage-points was 
relevant for only 8 percent of the DI cohorts, so the overall effect was limited.   
Together, these findings on pre-program selection suggest that the effects of NCNP 
contracting (compared to NCLP) on the behavior of providers was probably limited.  We offer   31   
several potential explanations for this result.  First, high fractions of clients being sent back could 
damage the reputation and future contracting prospects of providers.  Second, providers have 
little leeway to exploit any informational advantages over the social benefit administration.  In 
particular, the time span between the assignment of cohorts and the actual start of the program 
was only a few weeks.  It is unlikely that this period was long enough for providers to make an 
accurate assessment of the a priori chances of their clients finding work.  Furthermore, the 
contracted cohorts were intended to consist of fairly homogenous groups of workers, which 
likewise limited the room for selection behavior as well.  
Parking effects 
We argued earlier that parking might be an alternative device for pre-program selection, with the 
key difference that parking occurs after clients are assigned to providers.  In the case of strict 
performance-based contracting arrangements (like NCNP), parking is unlikely to raise (average) 
job placement rates but may be beneficial if the value added of serving hard-to-place clients is 
low or when the program costs of serving them are high.  Parking behavior typically cannot be 
observed directly, and spending per client may also be difficult to discern.  Still, the data at hand 
allow us to derive a test on parking indirectly, essentially by focusing on its potential effect on 
job search durations of clients.  That is, parking is characterized as providers concentrating their 
effort on clients with better job prospects, causing the prospects for this group to improve, while 
hard-to-place clients receive less attention (doing little to affect or even decrease their job 
prospects).  Stated differently, the job search durations of easy-to-place clients will become 
shorter, while those of hard-to-place clients will be unchanged or may even lengthen.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 We also estimated model variants for sub samples, using the two stage selection approach.  This led to similar, but 
less efficient coefficient estimates, as cohort characteristics as size and benefit scheme largely explain the 
probability of NCNP payment schemes as well.      32   
The test for parking that we implement entails a comparison of the average job search 
duration for clients in NCLP and NCNP cohorts that have found a job.  Under the parking 
hypothesis, we expect job duration to be shorter for NCNP cohorts.  In the appendix to this paper, 
we present the technical details of this test.  Specifically, as the average job search duration of 
job finders is a function of the job placement rate (which may differ between NCLP and NCNP 
cohorts), a simple comparison between the truncated average durations—controlling for gross 
cohort type fixed effects—may give biased results.  We therefore control for job placement rate 
differentials by employing (and controlling for) a first order Taylor series expansion, so as to 
distinguish the variation in truncated average job finding durations that can be associated with 
parking only. 
 
Table 6: Program length differentials and test statistics for NCLP-NCNP parking 
difference, using job search durations of job finders  
(Standard errors in parentheses; *, ** and ***  
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively) 
 
    Effect  of NCNP on Log 
Program Length  
Test statistic, corrected  








Full sample      ─0.154***  (0.049)  ─0.113  (0.088) 
             
< 50 clients      ─0.158***  (0.045)  ─0.249**  (0.113) 
≥ 50 clients      ─0.163***  (0.048)  ─0.067  (0.081) 
             
DI cohorts      ─0.086***  (0.038)  ─0.221*  (0.122) 
UI cohorts      ─0.209***  (0.051)  ─0.031  (0.081) 
             
Coefficient estimates follow from (pooled) FE estimation with gross cohort types as fixed effects and controlling for year effects. 
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  Table 6 shows the estimated test statistics for parking differentials between NCLP and 
NCNP cohorts, with and without controlling for differentials in job placement rates (for 
subsamples of our data).  The table also contains coefficient estimates of (log) program length 
differentials between NCLP and NCNP cohorts, (again) after controlling for gross cohort type 
fixed effects and year dummies.  Clearly, the observed program lengths are shorter for NCNP 
cohorts, with estimates ranging from 8 to 21 percent.  The coefficient estimates obtained for 
program lengths are comparable in magnitude to those for differentials in the job search 
durations of job finders (that is, our test statistic for parking that does not correct for job 
placement rates).  As the windfall gains of additional job placements within the program for 
NCNP contracts were larger, one may expect program lengths to be longer for NCNP contracts.  
Instead, it appears that NCNP contracting encouraged providers to concentrate on short term 
services for their clients, being less costly and requiring shorter program lengths.  In UI cohorts, 
the opportunities for providers to respond accordingly were probably greater, which is reflected 
in the larger effect of NCNP contracting we find for this subsample.  We return to this issue 
below when discussing the estimation results for job placement rates. 
 For the full sample, we find that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of “no parking.”  
Although the average job search duration of job finders is significantly shorter in NCNP cohorts 
(about 12%, or 35 days), controlling for job placement rates yields a coefficient estimate that is 
insignificant.  Focusing on the subsamples in our data, however, we find evidence for parking in 
smaller cohorts (less than 50 clients) and weak evidence for DI cohorts, with estimated effects of 
25 percent and 22 percent, respectively.  Thus, similar to pre-program selection, it appears that 
parking is confined to cohorts where placement risks and program costs per client were greater.  
Parking may be one way to lower the financial risks in some contracts—particularly those for   34   
smaller DI cohorts—casting doubts on the likelihood of strong unintended effects of incentives 
induced by NCNP contracting.  
Job placement rate effects 
In estimating the impact of NCNP payment schemes on provider job placement rates, we 
essentially follow the same two estimation strategies as for the selection models in equations (3) 
and (4).  An important difference now is that pre-program selection itself may have affected the 
composition of clients in the net cohorts—at least to the extent that this in turn has affected the 
job placement rates, as compared to the gross cohorts.  We thus add both provider and client-
induced selection as additional controls, and specify the job placement rate (JPR) per cohort k at 
time t, for cohort type j and gross cohort type i as:  
 
(4)  JPRijk, t  = a
JPR NCNP ij,t   +   Zijk, t b
JPR   + d
P S
p
ijk, t  +  d
C S
C




In equation (4) a
JPR and b
JPR describe the effect of NCNP contract types and other cohort 
characteristics Z on JPR, respectively.  Moreover d
P and d
C denote the effect of provider and 
client-induced selection on the job placement rates of the (remaining) clients in the cohort. ε
JPR is 
an i.i.d. residual with mean zero and variance σJPR
2.  Similar as the selection models, we estimate 
treatment selection models for NCNP in the first stage, and equation (4) in the second stage, 
adding Mill’s ratios that are obtained from equation (1).  The second research strategy is the 
gross cohort type fixed effects estimation of the model.  
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Table 7: Estimation results for job placement rate model  
(Effects in %-points; standard errors in parentheses; *, ** and ***  
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively) 
 
















             
NCNP payment scheme  11.115***  (1.999)  7.489*  (3.947)  2.555*  (1.436) 
             
Provider-induced selection  ─13.331  (8.835)  ─10.995  (8.222)  ─10.867*  (4.768) 
Client-induced selection  2.331  (4.333)  ─0.006  (5.310)  ─2.623  (2.986) 
Disability Insurance (dummy)  ─4.578**  (1.795)  ─4.949***  (1.769)  ─8.005***  (2.761) 
(Expected) reward per client  ─0.839  (0.582)  0.298  (0.764)  0.399  (0.461) 
Log gross cohort size  0.258  (0.532)  0.388  (0.769)  0.194  (0.348) 
             
Year = 2003  ─3.955  (2.402)      2.039*  (1.163) 
Year = 2004  0.762  (2.104)  4.371***  (1.600)  6.041***  (1.103) 
Year = 2005  ─5.754*  (2.990)  2.117  (2.848)  5.292***  (2.019) 
Expected job placement rate in 
2002 per gross cohort. 
    80.205***  (20.01)     
Constant  47.333***  (6.681)  8.671  (13.847)  17.621  (35.602) 
             
Mill’s lambda      ─3.542  (2.206)     
Rho      ─0.315  (0.188)     
             
N  8,302    3,819    8,302   
R-squared  0.177        0.318   
Log likelihood      4,390.4       
             
Note that the regressions also included (6) region dummies as controls in all specifications.  
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Table 8: Estimation results of effects of NCNP on different  
job placement rate types and for sub samples  
(Effects in %-point; standard errors in parentheses;  
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%) 
 
  Job contracts: 
 6-12 months 
Job contracts:  
more than 12 months 
Total effect on job 
placement 












             
Cohorts with < 50 clients  1.723  (1.154)  ─1.552  (1.113)  0.171  (1.594) 
Cohorts with ≥ 50 clients  3.614***  (1.135)  ─0.336  (0.664)  3.277**  (1.269) 
             
DI cohorts  3.387***  (1.079)  ─2.218*  (1.332)  1.117  (2.044) 
UI cohorts  2.707***  (0.917)  0.544  (0.391)  3.250***  (1.012) 
             
Total group  3.208**  (1.306)  ─0.653  (0.753)  2.556*  (1.436) 
 
  Table 7 shows the estimation results of equation (5) from GLS and the two estimation 
strategies that take into account potential endogeneity effects.  Next, Table 8 highlights the 
effects on (two) types of job placement rates—into short term and more durable jobs—and 
distinguishes the effects of NCNP with respect to cohort size (smaller or larger than 50 clients) 
and type of scheme (UI versus DI).  It should be noted that all coefficient estimates in Table 8 
derive from the (pooled) fixed effects estimation results. 
The comparison of GLS and the other estimates in Table 8 makes apparent that the 
NCNP contracts were mostly used for cohorts of clients with better job prospects; without 
controlling for these selection effects, the NCNP effect would be overestimated.  The overall 
picture that emerges is that the NCNP contracting has increased job placement rates, but with the 
effect being concentrated in short term placements (with contracts from 6 to 12 months) and for 
(larger) UI cohorts.  In particular, we find the overall effect of NCNP contracts on the job   37   
placement rates is equal to 7.5 percentage points in the treatment selection model and 2.5 
percentage points in the fixed effects model.  One may argue that parking decreased the 
effectiveness of the NCNP incentives in the smaller DI cohorts.  We further find the positive 
effect of NCNP on the UI cohorts to be confined to short-term employment contracts only, 
suggesting that providers with NCNP incentives focused on short-term employment contracts for 
their clients.  This confirms our earlier findings that indicated that NCNP cohorts had shorter 
program durations.  It is probable that the opportunities for finding temporary work and cutting 
costs were greater in cohorts with clients with better job prospects.  At the same time, however, 
we also find evidence that providers took the opportunity to increase the number of short-term 
employment contracts in DI cohorts, at the cost of fewer longer-term contracts.  
Table 7 shows that most (other) coefficient estimates of the controls in our sample are not 
statistically significant.  In addition, we unexpectedly find in one model that pre-program 
provider-induced selection decreased the job placement rates of WTW providers.  In case of 
cream-skimming, we would have expected this form of selection to increase job placement rates 
of the remaining cohort instead.  A possible explanation for this result would be that provider-
induced selection is high for low-quality WTW providers employing low-quality workers and/or 
with poorly managed programs.  We therefore re-estimated equation (4) with (pooled) gross 
cohort type fixed effects, extending the model with the addition of provider dummies as well.  
The resulting coefficient for provider-induced selection subsequently turns positive, increasing to 
2.218 (4.438), whereas the estimated impact of NCNP remains almost unchanged (with an 
estimate of 2.831 (1.400)).  Thus, it seems that high provider-induced selection in these cohorts 
is indeed associated with low-quality providers. 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have explored both the intended and unintended effects of performance-based 
contracting in social welfare services, using rather unique data on cohorts that were procured by 
the Dutch social benefit administration.  The results of our analysis generally fit expectations of 
the standard theoretical framework of risk and incentives, with incentives most likely to work 
when the financial risks of performance-contingent payments for providers are not too large to 
induce selection and parking behavior (Burgess and Ratto 2003).  It is possible that the Dutch 
benefit administration was aware of this, as they used NCNP payment schemes primarily for 
cohort types where clients had higher a priori chances of finding work and job placement risks 
per client were low.  At the same time, our analysis shows that the overall (additional) pre-
program selection and parking activities were probably low.  For the UI cohorts, we find that the 
NCNP payment scheme contributed to about a 3 percentage point increase in job placements, 
whereas there is no evidence for pre-program selection and parking.  Although this effect is 
smaller than those obtained in previous research—with estimates ranging from 5 to 10 
percentage points (Finn 2008)—for these cohorts, the NCNP schemes seem to have been 
generally successful. 
The downside of the story, however, is that NCNP contracting was not effective in 
raising job placement rates in DI cohorts, with evidence pointing to additional parking and 
provider- and client-induced selection here.  Both forms of selection by providers are seemingly 
driven by risk and cost considerations, which are particularly relevant for hard-to-place DI 
recipients.  Although it is difficult to assess the exact magnitude of these effects, parking may 
well have harmed both the efficiency of the program—in terms of job placement rates—and its 
equity in access to services.     39   
The other concern that follows from our analysis is related to the durability of jobs that 
were found in NCNP programs.  Additional job placements were almost fully confined to 
temporary employment arrangements of twelve months at maximum.  With the data at hand, we 
cannot infer whether this was to the detriment of the efficiency of the WTW-programs, 
particularly for UI clients.  The program might be viewed as highly successful if short-term jobs 
were a stepping stone to longer-term employment, and if shorter program lengths decreased the 
risk of lock-in effects for clients.  So far, however, other evidence seems to suggest that short- 
and long-term effects of programs are not strongly correlated (Heckman et al. 2002), casting 
doubt on the long-term effectiveness of the NCNP payment scheme. 
In general, the findings of this study suggest that in contexts where the risks to social 
welfare service providers of failing to meet contract expectations are greater, due to factors such 
as client characteristics that portend barriers to successful outcomes, performance-based 
contracts are less effective and are more likely to induce unintended effects such as parking that 
result in inequity in access to services.  Alternatively, there may be some small gains to 
contractual arrangements that put a greater portion of provider compensation at risk when the 
uncontrollable risks to provider contract outcomes are lower.  That said, these benefits of 
performance-based contracting appear to be limited to short-term outcomes, and thus, their 
effectiveness in increasing the long-run impact of public programs such as welfare-to-work 
services remains questionable.      
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APPENDIX: TESTING PARKING BEHAVIOR 
Parking behavior typically cannot be observed directly.  Still, the data at hand allow us to derive 
an indirect test for parking, essentially by focusing on its effect on job search durations of clients.  
The idea is that providers concentrate their effort on clients with better job prospects, causing the 
prospects for this group improve, whereas for the hard-to-place, they remain constant or even 
decrease.  Stated differently, parking shortens the job search durations of easy-to-place clients, 
while keeping constant or even lengthening those of hard-to-place clients.  Thus, if one was 
comparing two providers with equal job placement rates, we would expect the one with more 
parking to place clients into jobs more quickly (i.e., they have shorter durations in the program).  
Eventually, the other provider will catch up (in terms of its placement rate), as it more gradually 
finds jobs for the hard-to-place clients.   
Thus, an obvious test statistic for parking would entail a comparison of the average job 
search duration for clients in NCLP and NCNP cohorts that have found a job. Under this parking 
hypothesis, we expect job search durations to be smaller for NCNP cohorts. To formalize and 
develop such a test, we first introduce some notation: 
•  τ  = program length, which we assume  is the same for all cohorts.  
•  t = time, with 0 ≤ t ≤ τ .  
•  P(t) indicates the job placement rate of a cohort at time t. We only observe P at time t = τ. 
•  S(t) = 1 - P(t), which is the fraction of clients that have not found a job at time t (or: ‘the 
survival function’). 
•  θ(t) is the job finding hazard in a cohort at time t.  Thus,  S(t) = exp[ - ∫0
t  θ(s)ds ] 
•  E(t|t ≤ τ) is the expected job search duration of clients that have found a job before τ .  
      
   
We start by writing down the definition of the expected truncated job search duration: 
 
         ∫0
τ  S(t) dt –  S(τ) τ 
(A.1)  E (t|t ≤ τ)     =    ———————— 
                1 – S(τ)  
  
As the RHS of equation (A.1) is a function of P(τ), a simple comparison between the truncated 
average durations of NCLP and NCNP cohorts may give biased results.  In particular, if one of 
the cohort types has a higher placement rate, this would result in a lower value of the survival 
rate S(τ), regardless of whether this difference is associated with parking behavior.  We therefore 
define “no parking” as a situation where all hazard rates θ(t) during the program are affected 
proportionately by the higher placement rate, perhaps with a (small) percentage increase in α.  
It can easily be shown that the new survival function would then be S(t)
1-α  for all t.  Next, we 
perform a first order Taylor expansion on the log value of E (t|t ≤ τ) , with α = 0 as a point of 
reference.  The first order derivative with respect to α for α = 0 is: 
 
  ∂ ln E(t|t ≤ τ)               α S(τ)           α 
(A.2)  ———————   =   ─ α  ─   ————    =    ─   ——— 
         ∂ α             1-S(τ)       1-S(τ) 
 
and the derivative of (1) with respect to P(τ) for α = 0 is:      
   
 
   ∂ P(τ)           ∂ S(τ)  
(A.3)  ————     =     ─     ———    =   α S(τ)   
   ∂ α                      ∂ α 
 
Dividing (A.2) and (A.3) yields 
 
  ∂ ln E(t|t ≤ τ)                     1            
(A.4)    ——————   =   ─   —————      
        ∂ P(τ)            S(t) (1-S(τ) )          
 
Equation (A.4) shows that the (log) truncated expected value of job search durations 
decreases with respect to the job placement rate at time τ, assuming constant concavity of the 
survival function (i.e., without parking).  Thus, when comparing the (log values of) the truncated 
durations E(t|t ≤ τ) for cohorts with NCLP and NCNP, we control for differences in job 
placement rates as well.  In doing this, we first calculate the average derivative value of equation 
(4) for each gross cohort type i in our sample, measured for the “clean” baseline year 2002 when 
NCNP was still absent.
8 Similarly, we derive the average job placement rate per gross cohort 
type i , also for 2002 only.  Next, the “no-parking” effect of job placement rate differentials is 
estimated as the product of the average derivative value of equation (A.4) and the difference 
between the job placement rate of cohort ijt and the average job placement rate per gross cohort 
type in 2002.  We subtract this value from ln E(t| t ≤ τ) and then estimate the “clean” impact of 
                                                            
8 If we would perform a Taylor approximation within cohort types instead, we would not have the within variation 
that is needed to estimate the impact of NCNP contracting.      
   
NCNP on this value for 2003-2005, while controlling for gross cohort type fixed effects and year 
dummies. 